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Abstract: A binomial logit model was used to analyze relationships between financial 
characteristics and loan performance for FSA direct borrowers receiving direct FO or OL 
loans in fiscal 2005.  Not surprisingly, the results indicate a strong and direct relationship 
between many key financial variables and probability of default.  Production 
specialization, however, was indicated to have just as important an impact on probability 
of default as many financial variables.  Other strong indicators included farm size, 
membership in a targeted group, and the ability to obtain credit from commercial lenders. 
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Identifying and rating credit risk is an essential aspect of portfolio management for both 
public and private sector lenders.  Financial institutions typically evaluate credit risk 
based on a borrower’s default probability and subsequent losses. An understanding of the 
relationship between loan default and borrower characteristics is essential in risk 
evaluation.  Many lenders have not maintained databases which would enable such 
statistical analysis.  USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA), which administers both direct 
and guaranteed loan programs to farmers, has been no exception.  Historically, FSA has 
only maintained electronic records of loan accounting and borrower demographic data. 
All other loan records have been maintained at the local office in hardcopy format. Thus, 
collecting this data would have been time consuming and costly. 
 
In 2005, USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) implemented the Farm Business Plan, an 
accounting software package provided by the company ECI, which has allowed FSA to 
maintain detailed electronic records of borrower financial characteristics.   The Farm 
Business Plan provides detailed borrower level data on key financial, structural, and 
demographic variables. In the research documented in this report, these data are used to 
analyze relationships between financial characteristics and loan performance for FSA 
direct borrowers receiving loans in fiscal 2005.  
 
Virtually all financial institutions, public or private, utilize some type of risk-rating 
system. These systems serve a variety of purposes:  facilitating loan origination; 
monitoring loan portfolio safety and soundness; determining capital requirements; and servicing loans.  For public sector lenders such as FSA, risk rating can be an important 
determinant of budget outlays.  The President’s Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) determines budget outlays for Federal credit programs based upon anticipated 
defaults, recoveries, and repayments.  Federal credit programs are expected to utilize risk 
rating procedures to develop subdivisions of loans that are relatively homogeneous in 
cost, given the facts known at the time of obligation or commitment (OMB Circular A-
11).  These risk categories should group loans into cohorts that share characteristics 
predictive of defaults and other costs.  Historically, these risk categories have utilized 
loan variables, such as loan type and size, and some descriptive variables, such as firm 
size and ownership type, but have excluded a firm’s or individual’s financial information.  
 
The Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards states that each credit program 
should use an econometric default model to estimate probabilities of default for each risk 
cohort.
1   In this analysis a binomial logit model is developed to evaluate credit risk of 
FSA direct loans. Predicted default probabilities are then used to classify borrowers into 
groups considered more likely to default.  This procedure is compared with FSA’s current 




                                                 
1 Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board. “Amendments to Accounting Standards for Loans and 
Loan Guarantees”, May 2000 Appendix C: The Accounting Standards in Statement of Federal Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 2.  35. Each credit program should use a systematic methodology, such as an 
econometric model, to project default costs of each risk category. If individual accounts with significant 
amounts carry a high weight in risk exposure, an analysis of the individual accounts is warranted in 
making the default cost estimate for that category. 
  2 
Past Studies 
Agricultural credit assessment models have been used to evaluate, or screen, loan 
applications of potential borrowers and to assess, or review, the credit performance of 
existing borrowers. Miller and LaDue (1989) used farm size, liquidity, solvency, 
profitability, capital efficiency, and operating efficiency to develop credit-scoring models 
for indebted dairy farms. They estimated logit models to discriminate between successful 
and defaulting borrowers and observed that larger borrowers were classified correctly 
using financial ratios.  Similiarly, Gallagher (2001) found credit assessment models 
predict that financial ratios such as leverage, liquidity, and profitability significantly 
influence loan performance. Turvey and Brown (1990) incorporated the cost of loan 
misclassification into a loan scoring model for a group of Canadian farm loans. Novak 
and LaDue (1994) found multi-period credit scoring measures provided more stable 
parameter estimates than single-period measures. 
 
Most studies of loan default, especially among mortgage loans, rely on the option pricing 
theory of loan default (Quercia, McCarthy, and Stegman). This theory states that at the 
beginning of each period, a borrower has the option of (1) making a payment, (2) paying 
off a loan in full, or (3) defaulting on a loan and returning any secured property to the 
lender in return for debt cancellation.  In determining whether to exercise the default 
option, these models presume that borrowers consider their equity in the secured property 
as a crude measure of when the option is ‘in the money”.  In addition to equity, studies 
have shown that the default decision is influenced by transaction costs, moving costs, and 
  3potential damage to a borrower’s credit rating, as well as borrower-related factors such as 
marital disruption and job loss (Epperson et al 1985, Quigley and Van Order 1991, 




The fundamental issue of credit risk, regardless of whether the lender is a public or 
private lender, relates to expected loss (EL).  The EL may be disaggregated into three 
elements which are typically analyzed separately (Barry).  These elements are probability 
of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and exposure at default (EAD).  As explained 
by Barry, the probability of default indicates a loss may occur, while loss given default 
indicates the severity of default and how badly it affects the firm. Loss given default is 
net of any recovery attributable to liquidation of secured property and any deficiency 
judgments rendered through foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings. Both PD and LGD 
are expressed in percentage terms which are then applied to the loan level (also called the 
exposure at default, EAD) to determine expected loss. The relationship between PD, 
LGD, EAD, and EL is expressed as follows: 
 
EL= (PD * LGD) *  EAD. 
 
The PD can be predicted by the type of borrower, underwriting variables, loan size, 
maturity, payment frequency, borrower characteristics, or external economic factors 
(Featherstone, Roestler, and Barry).  While the model is multiplicative, it is common in 
  4the finance literature to examine these aspects separately due to the inability to easily 
track loans through the default and recovery process.  For FSA credit programs, such 
tracking is especially difficult because defaulted loans may be restructured or 
consolidated with other loans, thereby making it difficult to allocate losses or recoveries 
to the initial loan.  Kachova and Barry as well as Featherstone, Roestler, and Barry 
modeled EL in this manner. Also, Featherstone and Boessen modeled loan loss severity 
using LGD * EAD separately from the PD. 
 
Our analysis focuses only on the PD component of the equation. The PD was estimated 
for cohorts of farm ownership (FO), and farm operating (OL) loans made during fiscal 
2005.  Data limitations do not allow analysis of loans made under the emergency loan 
(EM) program or of loans obligated in years other than fiscal 2005.
2   
 
The particular conceptual framework used to analyze defaults depends somewhat on 
available data.
3    Binomial logit models represent a commonly used framework to 
analyze loan default.  The binomial logit model utilizes a maximum likelihood estimation 
which is consistent and asymptotically efficient, and with large samples produces 
normally distributed coefficient estimates (Studenmund). The general form of the logistic 
model used in this analysis was: 
 
                                                 
2 The Farm Business Plan included data on some, but not all, borrowers receiving loans prior to FY 2005. 
Borrowers receiving only a 1-year operating loan prior to FY 2005,or who paid-off their FSA loan prior to 
full implementation of the Farm Business Plan were not likely included in the database. The EM loan 
program made too few loans in FY 2005 to allow meaningful analysis, and was not considered. 
 
3 Within the residential housing literature, many recent studies have used a proportional hazards model. 
However, ideally these models require panel data of a borrower’s financial condition over long periods of 
time along with the timing of defaults and payments 
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Where Y_DEF represents borrower default in the FO or OL program, and X is the vector 
of factors hypothesized to influence default.  Underwriting standards, many of which are 
established through regulation or statute, represent some of the key factors expected to 
influence default. Individual characteristics such as farm type specialization, marital 
status, organizational structure, and membership in a targeted group were also 
hypothesized to affect default probability. The empirical model used to estimate the 
probability of default was: 
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with variable descriptions provided in table 1. 
  
Data 
The analysis was undertaken using loan accounting data which was merged with 
borrower financial information from FSA’s Farm Business Plan.  The Farm Business 
Plan, which was fully implemented by FSA in mid-2005, is an on-line accounting system 
which documents cash flow, expenses, assets, debts, and other important financial 
information. Prior to this, FSA had utilized the Farm and Home Plan (FHP) since the 
1940’s. However, detailed records of the FHP were not filed electronically so FHP did 
  6not lend itself easily to analysis. The Farm Business Plan included data on all borrowers 
originating loans starting in fiscal 2005. 
The borrower level data from the Farm Business Plan provided a unique customer 
number, farm balance sheet information, farm income statement, cash flow statement, 
personal (nonfarm) financial and income data, as well as data on race, gender, production 
specialty, years of farming experience, and marital status. Loan accounting data provided 
a unique customer identifier, loan number, obligation amount, outstanding balance, 
obligation date, loan term, and assistance code. The performance of borrowers receiving 
loans in FY 2005 was determined using borrower’s end-of-month repayment status which 
was available through archived files.  These data provided information on whether a 
borrower was current and, if in default, how many days the borrower had been in default.   
Data records are for individual cases (loans), but this analysis focused on borrower 
performance, whereby a default on one OL loan is considered as a default on all OL 
loans. Thus, this analysis examines the payment performance of borrowers receiving OL 
loans in FY 2005 on all outstanding OL loans. Data were merged using a unique 
customer identifier creating a unique dataset combining (a) financial and socioeconomic 
characteristics at time of loan obligation with (b) loan repayment patterns. 
FSA loan applicants must meet general eligibility requirements with respect to 
participation in the farm enterprise and must meet certain financial criteria. At the time of 
loan application, loan officers evaluate a borrower’s financial position (utilizing recent 
balance sheet and historical earnings trends as well as projections for the next year) and 
determine if they meet eligibility standards.  Since eligibility requirements for FSA direct 
  7loans require that applicants demonstrate an inability to obtain credit from commercial 
lenders at reasonable rates and terms, underwriting criteria for direct FSA borrowers are 
less stringent that those of commercial lenders.  For example commercial lenders 
typically expect borrowers to show a repayment capacity margin of at least 110 percent 
while FSA merely requires the borrower to show that a repayment capacity of 100 
percent.  Among new OL borrowers in fiscal 2005, 58.1 percent reported a coverage ratio 
of less than 110 percent compared to 64.1 percent of new FO borrowers who exhibited 
such a coverage ratio (table 2). 
 
Past studies have shown the loan-to-value ratio to be one of the strongest indicators of 
default for all types of loans.  Hence, FSA applicants are required to securitize all of their 
loans.  But, the Farm Business Plan did not provide complete data on loan-to-value ratios 
for all borrowers. Loan-to-value ratios are less meaningful for OL borrowers while nearly 
all new FO borrowers had initial loan-to-values of 90 percent, except for down payment 
borrowers who had loan-to-value ratios between 80 and 85 percent.  The debt-asset ratio 
and borrower net worth, which was available for all borrowers, should be highly 
correlated with the loan-to-value ratio and a strong indicator of default. Borrowers with 
greater indebtedness would be expected to be more likely to default. Likewise, borrowers 
with limited amounts of equity should be more likely to default. More solvent borrowers 
may be able to draw on their equity to meet any cash shortfalls. Borrowers with only 
limited capital invested in the farm business would be considered to be more likely to 
default, since there is less of a personal stake to protect.  It was hypothesized that 
  8borrowers with less than $50,000 of net worth would be more likely to default.
4  This 
represented 40.1 percent of new OL borrowers and 28.5 percent of new FO borrowers 
(table 2). 
 
Borrowers reporting a farming loss, as indicated by a negative return on assets reported 
on the Farm Business Plan, were considered more likely to default.  Many farmers, 
however, rely heavily on non-farm sources of income to service outstanding farm debt.  
Net cash flow as was recorded in the Farm Business Plan, is the projected margin after 
debt servicing plus or minus capital sales/expenditures plus any beginning cash on hand 
and includes all owner withdrawals and non-farm income.  Larger net cash flows would 
indicate a greater ability to withstand economic adversity and to continue to meet debt 
obligations.  Likewise, borrowers with greater amounts of equity in liquid current assets 
should be more able to withstand financial adversity without defaulting. Personal equity 
was defined as personal current assets less personal current liabilities.   While borrowers 
for both FO and OL loans reported close $0 of personal equity, the standard deviation of 
just over $20,000 indicated that at least some borrowers would have had some personal 
liquidity (table 2).  
 
Farm type was disaggregated into five separate binary variables based on the NAICS 
code included in the Farm Business Plan.  These farm types included some of the more 
common specializations and accounted for about 80 percent of borrowers. Beef, dairy, 
and grain farmers represented over two-thirds of all borrowers receiving OL loans in 
                                                 
4 The threshold of $50,000 of net worth was approximately the median level on net worth for OL 
borrowers. 
  9fiscal 2005 (table 2).  In addition to differing economic conditions affecting different 
commodities, there are structural differences affecting the ability to repay.  For example, 
the income received by dairy farmers is more regular basis and less uncertain than the 
income of beef or grain farmers.  Compared to livestock or specialty crop producers, 
grain and cotton farmers receive a larger share of their income in Government payments 
which reduces some of the uncertainty. 
 
The total amount of direct loans received by borrowers during a fiscal year was expected 
to have an impact on default rates.   In most cases, borrowers only received one direct 
during a fiscal year.  But, about one-fourth of all direct OL borrowers received 2 or more 
new OL loans in FY 2005 compared to less than 1 percent for FO borrowers. All OL 
loans received by a borrower during the same fiscal year were summed to create the 
independent variable LOANSIZE.  A larger LOANSIZE indicates greater financial risk 
which would contribute to greater risk of default.  Conversely, larger LOANSIZE may 
also indicate a larger farm size since larger farms are likely to borrow greater amounts. 
Since larger farms may achieve greater economies of size, a larger LOANSIZE may also 
indicate a reduced risk of default. 
 
A share of FSA FO and OL loan funds are targeted for use by beginning and socially-
disadvantaged (SDA) farmers.  A beginning farmer is considered to be someone with 10 
years or less of farming experience, regardless of age. An SDA farmer is one who is a 
member of a racial or ethnic minority or a woman. A majority of the direct borrowers in 
FY 2005 were beginning farmers; 69 percent of FO, 56 percent of OL (table 2). These 
  10percentages are greater than targeting levels since some beginning farmers received non-
targeted funds. About 15 percent of both direct FO and OL borrowers were members of 
an SDA group, of which about 40 percent were women. A small share, 5 percent, of FO 
loans made to beginning farmers were down payment loans. Since beginning and SDA 
farmers typically have fewer financial resources, there borrowers were expected to be 
more likely to default.   
 
Studies of consumer and residential finance have shown that individuals undergoing a 
change in their marital status tend to be more likely to default.  A majority of direct 
borrowers were married couples. FO funds were highly targeted to beginning farmers, 
32.8 percent of whom were still single (table 2).  In comparison, about one-fifth of direct 
OL borrowers were single.  Only 2 to 3 percent of direct borrowers were divorced.  The 
expectation was that married couples should be the best credit risk because of the 
additional incomes which could be available to service any debt. Hence, both single and 
divorced borrowers were expected to have a greater probability of default. 
 
Small farms have been defined as any operation with less than $250,000 in annual sales 
(USDA, 1998). A large majority of direct borrowers fell in this category. About 96 
percent of FO and 83 percent of OL borrowers in FY 2005 would have been considered 
small farms (table 2).  Since small farms lack the economies of size and financial 
resources available to larger farms, they were expected to be more likely to default. 
 
  11Over 90 percent of direct borrowers were organized as a sole proprietorships as indicated 
by an individual being listed as the entity type (table 2). The remaining farms were 
partnerships, joint operations, limited liability corporations (LLC’s) or family farming 
corporations.  More complex organizations would have a greater number of individuals 
involved and, consequently, should have access to greater amounts of financial resources. 
Hence, borrowers organized as sole proprietorships were expected to be more likely to 
default than more complex entities. 
 
Since commercial lenders have higher underwriting standards than FSA, borrowers who 
obtain a greater proportion of credit from commercial lenders should be more financially 
sound and, hence, less likely to default.  Conversely, direct borrowers obtaining a larger 
share of their credit from FSA were expected to be more likely tor of default.  Based on 
the lender name, which was available in the Farm Business Plan, FCS borrowers could be 
identified
5.  About 12 percent of OL borrowers and 21 percent of FO borrowers were 
indicated to also be an FCS borrower (table 2).  FO borrowers may choose to borrow 
under the joint financing option, where FSA provides up to 50 percent of the credit while 
a private lender provides the rest. About one-third of direct FO’s were made under this 
option in fiscal 2005.  About 10 percent of OL and 17 percent of FO borrowers also had a 
FSA guaranteed loan outstanding. Since borrowers receiving funds through either the 
joint financing or guarantee program must be able to demonstrate creditworthiness 
sufficient to satisfy a private lender, they were considered less likely to default. 
 
                                                 
5 There were only 95 FCS lending associations compared to 7,500 commercial banks and 1,300 savings 
banks.  The large number of potential bank names made it impractical to identify institutions or to 
differentiate banks from other entities such as insurance companies, individuals, or input providers. 
  12Highly fractionalized credit, as evidenced by a large number of loans, is another indicator 
of default probability.  Using the loan schedule of the Farm Business Plan, the total 
number of loans to all lenders could be determined. Also, the loan schedule provided data 
on rates, terms, and payment status. Borrowers with larger shares of high-risk debt, which 
was defined as having higher interest rates, restructured terms, or was past-due,  were 
hypothesized to be more likely to default. On average, OL borrowers held about $27,000 
of this high-risk debt, or 7-percent of total, while FO borrowers held $46,000, or 10 
percent of their total debt (table 3). 
 
Results 
Logistic Regression  
Most of the factors hypothesized to impact on the probability of default for the OL 
program were found to be statistically significant with anticipated signs.  Overall the 
model was highly significant with 18 of the 27 variables determined to be statistically 
significant in the OL model and 13 variables determined to statistically significant in the 
FO model (table 4; table 5). 
 
Specialization in production of a certain commodities was indicated to one of the 
strongest default indicators.  Farms specializing in dairy and grain production were 
shown to be less likely to default for both the FO and OL programs.  The difference was 
especially pronounced among dairy farms, where log-odds ratios indicated the predicted 
default probability (PD) for dairy farms was half that of non-dairy farms for both FO and 
  13OL loans (table 6).
6  For FO loans, the PD for grain farms was less than a third of that for 
non-grain farms.  The PD was higher among cotton farmers as well as producers of 
specialty crops, which included producers of vegetables, fruit, nuts, greenhouse, and 
nursery products.  Specialization in specialty crops increased the PD by over 75 percent 
for FO and 38 percent for OL programs compared to non-specialty crop farms. These 
results may reflect lower levels of government support typically provided to producers of 
specialty crops, or the greater regularity of payments to milk producers.
7  The lower PD’s 
could also be a consequence of high grain and milk prices that may have benefited dairy 
and grain farmers more than producers of specialty crops over the last 3 years. 
 
Beginning farmers were expected to be less likely to default for both the FO and OL 
programs.  The parameter was statistically significant for both the OL and FO models, 
but had an unexpected sign (table 4; table 5)   The log-odds ratios indicated beginning 
farmers were 18 percent less likely to default in the OL programs and 30 percent less 
likely to default in the FO program (table 6). This outcome was somewhat unexpected 
given that beginning farmers tend to have fewer financial resources. One explanation 
may be that the borrower training and financial training programs targeted to beginning 
farmers are having an impact in reducing defaults
8.  Or, this outcome may be a 
consequence of higher targeting goals whereby FSA may be extending credit to 
financially stronger beginning farmers in an effort to meet these increased targets. 
                                                 
6 The log-odds ratio was defined as PD/(1-PD). 
 
7 FSA may receive an assignment  whereby a portion of the farmer’s milk receipts is paid to FSA in 
fulfillment of the debt (See 7 CFR  1404) 
8 Under 7CFR1924.74, a beginning farmer can be required to pursue financial training as a condition of 
obtaining a FSA direct loan. 
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The parameter for membership in an SDA group was statistically significant and had the 
expected sign for both programs (table 4; table 5).  Log-odds ratios indicated that an SDA 
borrower was 50 percent more likely to default than non-SDA borrowers for the FO 
program and 63 percent more likely to default for the OL program. This result would be 
consistent with the fewer financial resources typically owned by SDA farmers. 
 
The parameter for marital status was significant, but only in the OL model and only for 
the divorce indicator (table 4; table 5).  Compared to married borrowers, divorced OL 
borrowers were 40 percent more likely to default (table 6). This would be consistent with 
results obtained from studies of consumer and residential mortgage default where 
changes in life situations have been found to increase default probabilities. 
 
Loan size did not appear to be a very important factor influencing loan default.  
Borrowers with larger amounts borrowed through the OL program during FY 2005 were 
more likely to default, though the level of significance did not reach the 5 percent 
threshold (table 4).  The effect was minor with a $100,000 increase in total the amount of 
OL funds borrowed during the year only increasing the PD by 0.01 percent.   
 
Being a small farm borrower, defined as having less than $250,000 in annual sales, was 
found to have a statistically significant impact on default probability for the FO 
program.(table 4).  While small farms were indicated to also be more likely to default for 
the OL program, the parameter was not statistically significant.  Borrowers utilizing the 
  15FO joint financing option, who tended to operate larger farms, were only 40 percent as 
likely to default as FO borrowers not utilizing the FO joint financing option.  These 
results suggest that if may be the interrelationship between farm and loan size that 
influences default probability. Larger loan amounts do not necessarily increase default 
risk, as long as a large loan amount is consistent with a larger farm size. 
 
In general, borrowers who were able to obtain a portion of their credit from a commercial 
lender were less likely to default.  FO borrowers who were also FCS borrowers were only 
half as likely to default as non-FCS borrowers while OL borrowers with FCS loans were 
25 percent less likely than non-FCS borrowers to default.  OL borrowers who received a 
smaller share of their nonreal estate credit from FSA were also less likely to default. A 
10-percentage point increase in FSA’s share of nonreal estate debt increased default 
probability by 5 percent. The use of down payment loans by beginning farmers did not 
impact default probability.  While down payment borrowers would generally be expected 
to have fewer financial resources, they were required to provide 10 percent of the 
purchase price using their own funds which could have alleviated much of the risk. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the presence of an FSA guaranteed loan provided no indication 
of default probability.  While having both a guaranteed and direct loan may indicate 
progress toward graduation for a direct borrower; it may also indicate a deteriorating 
financial position for a guaranteed borrower. 
   
The organizational structure of the farm business was indicated to have an impact on 
default probability, but only for the OL program.  OL borrowers organized as sole 
  16proprietorships were 35 percent less likely to default than borrowers organized as 
partnerships, family corporations, or LLC’s (table 6).  This was somewhat unexpected, 
given that more complex business structures should have access to more financial 
resources. 
 
Among financial variables, solvency was indicated to be a strong default indicator, which 
was highly significant in both the FO and OL models (table 4; table 5). A 1 percent 
increase in the debt-asset ratio increased the PD by 0.7 percent for both programs (figure 
1).
9  Other strong indicators of default included liquidity in personal assets, the total 
number of loans outstanding, and the share of outstanding debt considered to be high risk.  
Liquidity in personal assets was highly significant for both models. On average, every 
$5,000 increase in personal equity decreased the PD by 5 percent for FO and 2 percent 
for OL loans.  The total number of loans outstanding to all lenders was also highly 
significant for both OL and FO programs (table 6).  For every additional loan, the PD 
increased by 4.5 percent for FO and 3.5 percent for OL loans (figure 2).  The share of 
total outstanding debt considered to be high risk was another strong indicator of default, 
though only for OL loans. Increasing the share of high risk debt by 1-percentage point 
increased the probability of default by 0.8 percent (table 6).  
 
Borrowers with shortcomings in either debt coverage or liquidity were more likely to 
default in both the FO and OL programs.  Borrowers who had coverage ratios of less than 
110 percent were 63 percent more likely to default in the FO program and 20 percent 
                                                 
9 This was determined by estimating the predicted probability of default across the entire data set at varying 
levels of the debt-asset ratio. 
  17more likely to default in the OL program.   Illiquid FO borrowers, who were defined as 
current liabilities exceeding current assets, had a 67 percent greater chance of defaulting 
while illiquid OL borrowers had a 34 percent greater chance of defaulting compared to 
more liquid borrowers (table 6).  Borrowers with a shortage of capital at the time of 
application, defined as net worth less than $50,000, were about 20 percent more likely to 
default in both programs.  The parameter for net cash flow was significant for the OL 
program, though the PD did not appear very sensitive to changes in cash flow.  A 
$10,000 increase in net cash flow was shown to only decrease the PD by 1.5 percent.  
Farmers experiencing a farming loss were actually shown to have a reduced PD on OL 
loans. This unexpected finding can probably be attributed to the greater importance of 
off-farm income relative to farm income in servicing debt, even among direct borrowers. 
 
Comparisons to FSA Scoring Model 
 
FSA uses a 4-category classification system to risk rate their direct loans.  Federal 
statutes require FSA to annually classify all borrowers based on their ability to graduate 
to commercial credit.  Also, borrowers receiving new loans must be classified upon loan 
closing.
10  FSA classification procedure awards points to each borrower based on 
measures of financial performance and operation stability in 5 categories:  solvency; debt 
coverage; liquidity; profitability; and collateral. Borrowers with the best scores are 
classified as commercial and should have greatest potential to graduate to commercial 
credit.   Borrowers with modest credit shortcomings would be considered standard. 
                                                 
10 See FLP-1 “FSA Handbook, General Program Administration” United States Department of Agriculture 
Farm Service Agency, Washington D.C. (Part VII, Section 4 ‘Borrower Account Classification). 
ftp://165.221.16.16/manuals/1-flp-r1.pdf 
  18Typically, these borrowers have underwriting shortcomings standards in at least one of 
the aforementioned categories.  Borrowers with multiple credit shortcomings, but are still 
meet minimum requirements with respect to debt coverage or collateral would be 
classified as acceptable.
11  The lowest category is considered marginal and would capture 
borrowers who are under-secured or with other significant credit shortcomings. 
 
Estimating the PD by FSA’s classification grouping reflects relative default risk, with the 
riskier classifications displaying greater PDs (figure 3).  A majority of the OL borrowers 
classified as commercial or standard have PDs of less than 22.2 percent. And, a majority 
of those classified as marginal have PDs of over 28 percent. The predictive ability of the 
logistic regression model depends on the cut-off level chosen to identify borrowers 
considered likely to default. Borrowers with a PD greater than or equal to the cut-off 
level would be considered likely to default while borrowers with a PD less than the cut-
off level would be considered not likely to default.  Choosing a cut-off value equal to the 
mean PD of 0.23 would result in 65.1 percent of borrowers having been correctly 
classified in the OL model and 85.86 percent in the FO model (table 7). Meanwhile, 28.8 
percent of borrowers would have been false positives in the OL model. A false positive 
means that a borrower was identified as likely to default by either the logit or FSA 
scoring model but did not. And, 9.1 percent of borrowers in the OL model were false 
negatives which mean they were not identified as likely to default but did not.  As the 
cut-off value is increased, the false positives decrease while false negatives decline. Cut-
                                                 
11Eligibility requirements stipulate that qualified FSA direct loan applicants be able to demonstrate cash 
flow and provide fully security for the loan.  
  19off levels for PD of 0.28 would have resulted in a larger percent of borrowers being 
correctly classified but would have increased the false negatives. 
 
The discreet classifications within FSA’s internal borrower classification model provide 
little flexibility in establishing a cut-off to determine likely default. Choosing a marginal 
classification as a cut-off value to identify likely defaulters would correctly identify 70.5 
percent of OL borrowers but would give 17.3 percent with false negatives. Using the 
‘Marginal’ classification of the FSA internal scoring model to identify likely FO defaults 
would have correctly classified 81.9 percent with 8.7 percent false positives and 9.5 
percent with false negatives.    
 
One of the goals of a default classification system would be to identify borrowers in 
greatest need of special servicing options.  Presumably, the special servicing options 
could be provided to help avoid default among those borrowers considered more likely to 
default. Thus, in addition to the percent correct, an important goal of a classification 
system would be to minimize false negatives.  Using these criteria, the probabilistic 
default model would appear to represent an improvement over the FSA scoring model in 
risk rating.  Also, the probabilistic default model provides greater flexibility in choosing a 
cut-off to predict default. 
Summary 
 
The results of the binomial logit model applied to FSA Farm Business Plan and loan 
performance data indicated a strong and direct relationship between many key financial 
  20variables, production specialization, membership in a targeted group, and the ability to 
obtain credit from commercial lenders. Borrowers who were more under-capitalized or 
illiquid were found to be more likely to default. Solvency, as measured using the debt-
asset ratio, was indicated to be a strong default indicator for both the FO and OL models.  
Likewise, borrowers with a shortage of capital at the time of application were more likely 
to default in both programs.  Borrowers with a larger proportion of their indebtedness at 
higher rates or with restructured terms were more likely to default. Liquidity in both 
personal and farm assets was highly significant for both models. Both OL and FO 
borrowers for whom current liabilities exceeded current assets had a greater chance of 
defaulting. 
 
Borrowers with fractionalized credit or repayment issues were found to be more likely to 
default.  The total number of loans outstanding to all lenders was also highly significant 
for both OL and FO programs.   Borrowers who had coverage ratios of less than 110 
percent were 63 percent more likely to default in the FO program and 20 percent more 
likely to default in the OL program. 
 
Borrowers who are able to obtain a portion of their credit from a commercial lender were 
less likely to default.  Borrowers who were FCS borrowers and those receiving a smaller 
share of their credit from FSA were found to be less likely to default.  Also, borrowers 
utilizing the FO joint financing option were notably less likely to default. 
 
  21Demographic factors were indicated to play an important role influencing loan defaults.  
Beginning farmers were unexpectedly shown to be less likely to default for both the FO 
and OL programs.  A possible explanation may be the greater servicing attention given to 
beginning farmers as a result of targeted financial training programs. As was expected, 
SDA borrowers were over 50 percent more likely to default for the FO program and 63 
percent more likely to default for the OL program. This result would be consistent with 
the fewer financial resources typically owned by SDA farmers. Compared to married 
borrowers, divorced borrowers were more likely to default, a result consistent with 
expectations. 
 
Economic conditions unique to a commodity group may be one of the key factors 
affecting loan defaults. Farms specializing in dairy and grain production were shown to 
be less likely to default while cotton and specialty crop producers were more likely to 
default.  These results may reflect
  structural differences or relative commodity prices for 
the time period analyzed.  
 
Estimating the PD by FSA’s internal classification verified that the riskier classes of 
borrowers were, in fact, more likely to default. Comparing FSA internal classification 
system with the results of the binomial logit suggested that the logit models greater 
flexibility better enabled an identification of borrowers in greatest need of special 
servicing options.  Presumably, the special servicing options could be provided to help 
avoid default among those borrowers considered more likely to default.  
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Table 1.  Variable Definitions. 
Variable Definition 
PD  Probability of default which is defined as =1 
if borrower has ever been 90 or more days 
past due since September of 2005 
FARMTYPE 
BEEF   1 if beef farm, 0 otherwise. 
COTTON  1 if cotton farm, 0 otherwise 
DAIRY  1 if dairy farm, 0 otherwise 
SPECIALTY_CROP  1 if vegetable, fruit & nut, or 
nursery/greenhouse farm, 0 otherwise 
GRAIN  1 if grain farm, 0 otherwise (corn or grain 
sorghum, soybean, wheat or other small 
grain)  
LOANSIZE  Total dollar amount of direct OL or FO loans 
received by the borrower during the fiscal 
year 
BEG  1 if borrower is considered a beginning 
farmer, 0 otherwise 
SDA  1 if borrower is a member of a socially-
disadvantaged group, 0 otherwise 
MARRITAL_STATUS 
SINGLE  1 if borrower has never been married, 0 
otherwise 
DIVORCE  1 if borrower is divorced and not re-married, 
0 otherwise 
SMALL_FARM  1 if annual farm sales are less than $250,000, 
0 otherwise 
SOLE_PROP  1 if entity type is listed as ‘Individual’, 0 
otherwise 
CASHFLOW  Dollars of net cash flow after all obligations 
have been paid. 
DARATIO  Ratio of farm debt to farm assets 
LOW_EQUITY  1 if borrower has $50,000 or less of farm 
equity, 0 otherwise.  
LOW_COVRATIO  1 if borrower has term debt coverage ratio of 
1.10 or less, 0 otherwise 
NOT_LIQUID  1 if borrower has a liquidity ratio of 1.0 or 
less, 0 otherwise 
HI_RSK_SHR  Share of total principal outstanding on loans 
that have been restructured, refinanced, with 
rates greater than 9-percent, currently past-
due or where the lender is identified as a 
credit card. 
FARMING_LOSS  1 if borrower has a return on assets of 0% or 
less, 0 otherwise 
 
   
  23Table 1.  Variable Definitions. (continued) 




Dollars of personal current assets less 
personal current liabilities 
FSA_SHR 
 
FSA_SHR_NR  Total share of total nonreal estate debt 
provided by FSA 
FSA_SHR_RE  Total share of total nonreal estate debt 
provided by FSA 
FCS  1 if borrower has an outstanding loan with the 
FCS, 0 otherwise 
NUMBER_OF LOANS  Total number of loans from all lenders. 
GTE  1 if borrower has an outstanding FSA 
guaranteed loan, 0 otherwise 
LOAN_TYPE   
OP_LOAN  1 if 50% or more of direct OL debt is for a 1 
year term, 0 otherwise. 
REFI  1 if the primary purpose for new OL loan 
funds is to refinance existing indebtedness, 0 
otherwise 
DPAY  1 if the primary purpose for new FO loan 
funds is for down payment loan; 0 otherwise 
JOINT  1 if the primary purpose for new FO loan 
funds is for joint finance loan; 0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Means of Variables Used in Logit 





Borrowers defaulting   23.8 12.4
Farm type 








 SINGLE  27.8 33.8










PERSONAL EQUITY  -2,704 376
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Table 3. Means and Distribution of Key Financial Variables by Loan 
Type, for FSA Borrowers Receiving Direct OL or FO loans in Fiscal 
2005. 






 Dollars  per  Borrower 
Loan size  69,858 54,891 123,703 56,929 
   7-yr loans  57,899 53,307  
   
   1-yr loans  93,107 77,638  
   Down payment      61,392 23,822 
   Joint financing      124,303 54,184 
Annual farm sales  162,557 220,993 150,887 207,325 
Net cash flow  7,440 42,568 7,804 41,880 
Total farm assets  395,998 532,948 476,237 540,100 
   Current assets  60,046 138,409 76,188 134,360 
Total farm liabilities  230,346 280,194 305,691 298,367 
     FCS Debt  14,956 79,307 33,635 172,574 
     Hi-risk debt  27,840 98,322 46,124 155,164 
  Real estate debt  81,396 156,486 194,048 160,991 
  Nonreal estate debt  148,950 151,963 111,643 162,677 
      Current liabilities  59,890 91,911 64,531 134,360 
      Intermediate liabilities  89,015 103,338 47,112 84,846 
Total farm equity  165,651 345,488 170,547 304103 
Current personal equity  -2,704 23,831 376 21,395 
  Number per borrower 
Number of loans  6.7 5.0 6.6 4.6 
Financial ratios  Percent 
Debt_assets ratio  58.2 27.4 64.1 31.1 
Current ratio  1.64 1.91 2 2.33 
ROA 3.66 3.55 1.78 6.78 
Coverage ratio  1.07 1.72 1.09 4.02 
Sources: FSA Farm Loan Programs Farm Business Plan;  











  26 
 
Table 4. Logistic Regression Results for Defaults on Direct OL 











INTERCEPT -2.74064  145.5256    <.0001  *** 
 (0.22719)         
LOANSIZE 0.117857  3.5974    0.0579   
 (0.06214)         
BEEF -0.0344  0.1244    0.7243   
 (0.09750)         
COTTON 0.274693  3.2906    0.0697   
 (0.15143)         
DAIRY -0.731  35.6582    <.0001  *** 
 (0.12242)         
SPEC_CROP 0.317689  5.4523    0.0195  ** 
 (0.13605)         
GRAIN -0.28078  7.7979    0.0052  ** 
 (0.10055)         
BEG -0.16474  5.0965    0.0240  ** 
 (0.07297)         
SDA 0.491252  31.3241    <.0001  *** 
 (0.08777)         
SINGLE 0.073431  0.8032    0.3701   
 (0.08194)         
DIVORCE 0.323287  3.8145    0.0500  * 
 (0.16553)         
SMFARM 0.149733  2.3039    0.1290   
 (0.09865)         
SOLE_PROP -0.30636  5.8482    0.0156  * 
 (0.12669)         
CASHFLOW -0.19804  5.14    0.0234  * 
 (0.08735)         
DARATIO 0.981452  43.7635    <.0001  *** 
 (0.14836)         
LOW_EQUITY 0.19922  6.7208    0.0095  ** 
 (0.07685)         
LOW_COVRATIO 0.157308  5.0552    0.0246  * 
 (0.06997)         
NOT_LIQUID 0.292716  13.5226    0.0002  ** 
 (0.07960)         
HI_RSK_SHR 1.189458  65.8957    <.0001  *** 
 (0.14653)         
FARMING_LOSS -0.22051  8.1004    0.0044  ** 
 (0.07748)         
PERSONAL_EQUITY -0.56512  19.9737    <.0001  *** 
 (0.12645)         
FSA_SH_NR 0.742625  21.9506    <.0001  *** 
  27 (0.15851)         
 












FCS -0.2644  6.6765    0.0098  ** 
 (0.10233)         
NUMBER_OF_LOANS 0.048647  49.1056    <.0001  *** 
 (0.00694)         
OPLOAN -0.07243  0.7203    0.3960   
 (0.08534)         
REF -0.11087  1.1404    0.2856   
 (0.10382)         
GTE -0.13431  1.5919    0.2070   
 (0.10645)         
Likelihood ratio 
(Ho : βi= 0) -2 Log L 
 
545.0687  <.0001  *** 
Number of 
observations 7,618      
Number Defaults  1,730      
Percent of loans 
defaulted 22.7      
*     PR > Chi-Square ≥ 0.01 and < 0.05 
**   PR > Chi-Square ≥ 0.0001 and < 0.01 
*** PR > Chi-Square  < 0.0001 
 
.   
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for Defaults on Direct FO loans 












INTERCEPT -2.87573 21.1184 <.0001  *** 
 (0.62578)        
LOANSIZE 0.00482 0.001   0.9742   
 (0.14877)        
BEEF -0.46226 4.7817 0.0288  * 
 (0.21139)        
COTTON -0.50174 0.4995 0.4797   
 (0.70996)        
DAIRY -1.00639 9.6486 0.0019  ** 
 (0.32399)        
SPEC_CROP 0.48111 1.6137 0.2040   
 (0.37874)        
GRAIN -1.32447 26.7385 <.0001  *** 
 (0.25614)        
BEG -0.36973 3.8293 0.0500  * 
 (0.18894)        
SDA 0.39062 3.961 0.0466  * 
 (0.19627)        
SINGLE 0.05384 0.0854 0.7701   
 (0.18424)        
DIVORCE 0.36233 0.5466 0.4597   
 (0.49008)        
SMFARM 0.53377 3.884 0.0487  * 
 (0.27084)        
DPAY -0.56506 1.1674 0.2799   
 (0.52298)        
JOINT -0.87097 14.7991 0.0001  *** 
 (0.22640)        
SOLE_PROP -0.48632 1.3345 0.2480   
 (0.42098)        
DARATIO 0.84761 8.8738 0.0029  ** 
 (0.28454)        
CASHFLOW -0.07594 0.1486 0.6999   
 (0.19699)        
LOW_EQUITY 0.16627 0.689 0.4065   
 (0.20030)        
LOW_COVRATIO 0.51990 9.7226 0.0018  ** 
 (0.16674)        
NOT_LIQUID 0.46395 7.3236 0.0068  ** 
 (0.17144)        
HI_RSK_SHR 0.07241 0.0278 0.8677   
 (0.43451)        
        













FARMING_LOSS 0.23698 1.6101 0.2045   
 (0.18676)        
PERSONAL_EQUITY -1.41565 14.187 0.0002  ** 
 (0.37585)        
FSA_SHR_RE   0.25170 0.4689 0.4935   
 (0.36758)        
FCS   -0.57159 5.1484 0.0233  ** 
 (0.25191)        
NUMBER_OF_LOANS 0.05918 10.7344 0.0011  *** 
 (0.01806)        
GTE   0.23711 1.0615 0.3029   
 (0.23014)        
Likelihood ratio 
(Ho : βi= 0) -2 Log L 
 
196.625  <.0001 *** 
Number of observations  2,134       
Number Defaults  247       
Percent of loans defaulted  11.57       
*      PR > Chi-Square ≥ 0.01 and < 0.05 
**    PR > Chi-Square ≥ 0.0001 and < 0.01 
***  PR > Chi-Square  < 0.0001 
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Table 6. Log-odds Ratios for Binary 
Independent Variables. 
 Program  Model 
Variable FO  OL 
Farm type     
Beef  0.630  0.967
Cotton 0.605  1.315
Dairy  0.366 0.481
Specialty crop  1.618  1.373
Grain  0.266 0.755
Targeted Group   
Beginning 
farmer 0.691  0.848
SDA  1.478 1.634
Marital Status   
Single 1.055  1.076
Divorce 1.437  1.382
Financial 
Indicators  
Low equity  1.181 1.221
Low debt 
coverage  1.682 1.170
Illiquidity 1.590  1.340
Farming loss  1.267  0.803
Loan purpose   
Op. loan   0.930
Refinance   0.894
Down payment  0.568   
Joint financing  0.419   
     
FCS Borrower  0.565 0.767
FSA GTE 
borrower 1.268  0.874
Small Farm  1.705  1.163
Sole 
Proprietorship 0.615  0.737
Parameters which were statistically 
significant in the regression model are 
indicated in italics 
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Table 7. Predictive Ability of Default Model Compared with FSA Borrower 
Classification 
OL Model  Probability of Predicted Default 
Borrower 
classification 




 --Percent  of  borrowers-- 
Correct 31.0  42.2 65.1 72.3 53.2  70.5
False Positive  68.2  54.9 28.8 15.1 37.1  12.2
False Neg.  0.8  2.8 9.1 12.7 9.8  17.3
FO Model 










  --Percent of borrowers-- 
Correct 58.0  77.6 85.9 87.4 59.0  81.9
False Positive  40.2  17.9 6.3 3.0 34.8  8.7







































Figure 1. Probability of Default by Debt-Asset Ratio for Direct Loans Obligated in 
FY 2005. 
 
























































PD=  0.159            0.230            0.243            0.298
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Predicted Probability of Default (PD) by FSA Score. 
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